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Introduction
Basic Concepts of German Criminal Procedure - An Introduction
Michael Bohlander*
DURHAMLAWREVIEW2011]
One ofthe characterisations ofthe German as a member ofthe family of
continentallegal systems heard most oßen is that its procedure is
inquisitorial, as opposed to the adversarial model. Eut what does that
really mean? Is it all encapsulated in the role ofthejudge, or are there
otherfeatures that define the character ofthe German procedure as
inquisitorial? Is it actually still useful to use the terminology of
((inquisitorial vs. adversarial"? Does ((inquisitorial" not tend to convey
connotations that remind us ofmedievalpractices involving dungeons,
torture, extorted confessions, draconic punishments and the personal
union ofprosecutor, judge and executioner in the figure ofthe inquisitor,
or a burden on the defendant to prove their innocence etc.? Is the
standard ofproofin the continental systems, sometimes called intime
conviction according to its French variant O1freie Überzeugung in
German, really lower than the ((beyond reasonable doubt" standard that
common lawyers tend to be so proud op This paper will provide an
overview ofthe systemic model ofGerman criminal procedure and its
fundamental principles.
One of the major distinctions often heard about the German as a member
of the family of continental legal systems is that its procedure is
inquisitorial as opposed to the common law adversarial model. But what
does that really mean? Is it all encapsulated in the role ofthe judge, or are
there other features that defme the character of the German procedure as
inquisitorial? Is it actually still useful to use the terminology of
"inquisitorial vs. adversariai"? Does "inquisitorial" not tend to convey
connotations that remind us of medieval practices involving dungeons,
torture, extorted confessions, draconic punishments and the personal
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* Professor ofLaw, Durham Law School. - This paper is a modified version ofthe
chapter on basic concepts in my forthcoming book Principles of German Criminal
Procedure, 2011, Hart Publishing. I thank the publisher for his gracious consent to its
use for the Review. All sections (§) mentioned in this paper are from the
Strafprozessordnung (Code of Criminal Procedure - StPO) unless otherwise mentioned.
Abbreviated German law journal titles etc. are used according to the common German
usage and can be found in the abbreviation section of any major German law journal;
they are as such usable in the search engine of the German database JURIS
(www.juris.de).
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union l of prosecutor, judge and executioner in the figure of the
inquisito~, or a burden on the defendant to prove their innocence etc.? Is
the standard of proof in the continental systems, sometimes called intime
conviction according to its French variant or freie Überzeugung in
German, really lower than the "beyond reasonable doubt" standard that
common lawyers tend to be so proud of? A quick look at the law will
teach us that none of these worrisome features are part and parcel of the
German approach, and indeed any modem continental procedure, even if
some very high level common law practitioners and academics that I have
met over the years seem to think that, for examjle, continental
inquisitorial systems do not have an equivalent to the 5 Amendment in
the US Constitution and that an accused has to cooperate with the
prosecution in her own trial and prove her innocence.
These voices appear to lose sight of the fact that German law, just to
name a few examples, does not accept any sort of reverse burden of proof
on the defence, that the defence is in principle not obliged to provide any
sort of disclosure to the prosecution or even the court or to tell them in
advance the nature of the defence case, nor is the defendant at risk of
adverse comment for merely exercising her right to silence in the pre-trial
stage and then choosing to make a statement in court. The defendant is
protected by the rule of nemo tenetur se ipsum accusare, i.e. no-one must
cooperate in their own prosecution and conviction, to which the fact is a
corollary that the defendant is not a witness in her own cause, not an
object of but a subject in the proceedings3• She cannot therefore incur
liability for perjury because she does not testify and is never under oath, a
situation that has come to be called by many common lawyers the
(in)famous "right to lie". The presumption of innocence, yet another
example, is actually stronger under German law than under English law
and models based on the English understanding, because it attaches until
1 It might be worth reflecting upon the question to which extent such a personal union
has been cemented in the UK by the introduction through Part 3 of the Criminal Justice
Act 2003 of conditional cautions issued by the CPS and/or the police, see Peter
Hungerford-Welch, Criminal Procedure and Sentencing, 2008, 115 ff. The equivalent to
police cautions, the so-called polizeiliche Strafverjügungen, were abolished in Germany
by § 6 of the Einjührungsgsetz zur Strafprozessordnung (EGStPO), i.e. the Code of
Criminal Procedure (Introduction) Act; their function has de facto been assumed by the
Bußgeldbescheid, i.e. a summary fme by the administrative authority in charge, which
does, however, no longer have criminal but merely administrative character and is
administered under separate legislation, the Ordnungswidrigkeitengesetz - OWiG.
2 A fact which as led some to argue - rightly - that the expression "judge-Ied" is a better
representation ofthe material substance ofthe law.
3 Evidence for this is, for example, that the defendant retains the right to ask questions to
witnesses and experts, to make motions and seize the court directly of any matter even if
she is represented by counsel. She is not relegated by either law or custom to sitting in
the dock and merely watching the efforts of her counsel, as appears to be the case in
many common law systems. In practice the picture is, however, very similar for obvious
reasons and it is a rare defendant who, although represented, will conduct her own
witness examination, but it is not infrequent that she will ask supplementary questions.
the conviction has become fmal, that is until the last avenue of appeal has
been exhausted.4 This, in the European context for example, in turn is
predicated upon the understanding of what it means to be "proved guil~
according to law" (Art. 6(2) ECHR): In England, this stage is (arguably )
reached with the jury verdict at trial, because there is no right to appeal
against such a verdict absent leave being granted by the iudex ad quem or
iudex a quo.6 In Germany (with one exception7) and most if not all
continental European countries there is an automatie right to appeal -
albeit in various shapes and forms depending on which court's decision
is being appealed - against a trial verdict8 and thus a verdict cannot
4 See for a detailed explanation in the context of international criminal law Michael
Bohlander, Death of an Appellant [2010] Criminal Law Forum, 495.
5 In theory, the logical conclusion should be that it actually stretches until the decision
denying leave has become fmal because there is a right to ask for leave, but that may be
a legal nicety.
6 Which is in stark and somewhat odd contrast to the situation in the Magistrates' Court,
where there is an automatic right of appeal to the Crown Court under s. 108(1)
Magistrates' Courts Act 1980 and s. 48 Senior Courts Act 1981, apart from other ways
of challenging the verdict to the High Court by way of case stated or judicial review -
see Hungerford-Welch, Criminal Procedure and Sentencing, 7th ed., 2008 (hereinafter
Hungerford-Welch), 377 ff. and Pt. 63 ofthe Criminal Procedure Rules 2010.
7 § 313 - This provision, which was introduced as a measure of easing the docket
overload and consequent backlog in the lower courts by the Gesetz zur Entlastung der
Rechtspflege, i.e. the Administration of Justice (Reduction of Workload) Act, of 1993,
allows the appellate court to dismiss an appeal without a hearing if either the defendant
appeals against a fme or a warning of a fme of not more than 15 daily units (see §§ 40,
59 StGB) or a summary fine (Geldbuße), or the prosecution appeals against an acquittal
or closure of the proceedings and they had not asked for a fme of more than 30 daily
units, if the appeal is obviously unfounded. § 313(2), however, makes it clear that this is
not an additional requirement for an appeal because the "leave" must be granted unless
the appeal is obviously without merit, in which case it shall be dismissed by written
procedure as unzulässig i.e. inadmissible. In other words, the law does not introduce a
leave requirement but merely allows to court to dispose of the appeal based on its paper
form, and to dispense with a hearing. This provision was politically motivated based on
budgetary and staffmg constraints in the judiciary, is widely regarded as a systemic
artefact and as probably inapplicable in juvenile proceedings. It has the clear potential
for misuse by both judges and prosecutors by encouraging them to dispose of a case, for
example, by reducing the number of daily units and increasing the amount of the daily
unit instead, because the latter is not a criterion for § 313. - See Lutz Meyer-Goßner,
Strafprozessordnung, 53rd ed. (2010) (hereinafter MG) § 313 marginal no. (hereinafter
Mn.) 2 with further references.
8 See the Green Paper 0/ the European Commission on the Presumption o/Innocence -
COMM (2006) 174 fmal - and the replies by individual countries and organisations, all
available at
http://ec.europa.eu/justice_home/news/consulting--'public/presumption_oeinnocence/ne
ws_contributions--'presumption_oeinnocence_en.htm, especially Question 8 on the
duration of the presumption where the following picture emerged: There is a clear split
between the civil law and common law countries in Europe. The former all put the
emphasis on the fmal i.e. unappealable judgment (answers received from Germany,
Austria, Czech Republic, France, Hungary, Italy, Poland, Slovakia, Turkey [answer not
fully clearD. The following organisations replied in the same vein: Amnesty
International, Deutscher Anwaltverein, Bundesrechtsanwaltskammer, Centro Studi di
Diritto Penale, European Judicial Network. The only answers that chose the fIrst
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sources that we will be looking at are, after the international and
European Union13 levels of legislation, the following laws:
13 European law has so far impacted mostlyon the areas of international cooperation in
prosecution and enforcement, for example, through instruments such as the European
Arrest Warrant, the European Evidence Warrant, the Framework Decision on fmancial
penalties etc. For the German view on these developments and the German
implementing legislation see Wolfgang Schomburg/Otto Lagodny et al., Internationale
Rechtshilfe in Strafsachen, 5th ed., forthcoming 2011.
14 A famous and highly controversial case on this issue was the trial of Erich Honecker
the former Chair of the Politbüro and Head of the Council of Stat~
(Staatsratsvorsitzender) of the now defunct German Democratic Republic, whose trial
was stopped because of a procedural bar pursuant to § 206a under recourse to the
constitution of the Land Berlin, because he was terminally ill and therefore being put on
trial violated his human dignity according to the Berlin, not the federal, constitution. See
Berliner Verfassungsgerichtshof (BerlVerfGH) NJW 1993, 515 and the critical
literature voices listed at MG § 112 Mn. lla; more generally on the matter see BVerfGE
96,345; 103,332.
15 However, there is potential for abuse as weIl which is borne out by the previous
practice in many courts to use adult law for traffic offences by young adults, because
become final until there is no more chance of an appeal. The standard of
proof required in § 261 for conviction, the "free conviction" (freie
Überzeugung) does in effect mean exactly the same thing as the
reasonable doubt standard, because the judge must be convinced of the
facts as supported by the evidence to a degree that "reasonable and not
merely theoretical doubts are exc1uded,,9. In addition, the judge must set
out her reasons for her persuasion in the judgment, something an English
jury does not do and an English appellate court could thus in effect be
said to be merely making an educated guess about whether the jury
verdict is unsafe, based on the directions of the judge and his overall
handling of the trial. The reasons are susceptible to full appellate review
against the parameters laid down in the law, a degree ofprotection against
judicial arbitrariness which is arguably higher than in English law. In
sum, this short overview of some of the features of German procedural
law should have shown that we better be wary of attaching significant
substantial connotations to mere terminological usage and should abstain
from generalisations.
The Applicable Law10
German criminal11 procedure is determined by a number of legal sources
mainly on the federallevel, much like the substantive law, and the same
hierarchy of norms as well as rules of interpretation apply.12 The main
conviction as the critical point were those from Ireland and the Bar Council of England
and Wales; they did, however, point out that the presumption is revived once a
conviction is quashed. The Bar Council expressly emphasised that this position is
intricately linked to the fact that there is no automatie right of appeal from a conviction
in the Crown Court, but only with leave of the latter or the Court of Appeal. The impact
of the domestic appeals model on the operational scope of Artic1e 6(2) is c1early brought
out, for example, in the case of Callaghan v. UK, European Commission of Human
Rights, Decision of9 May 1989, Application no. 14739/89.
9 Consistent jurisprudence of the Bundesgerichtshof (BGH) and the lower courts, see
BGH NStZ 1988,236; NStZ-RR 2010,85; Oberlandesgericht (OLG) K.arlsruhe, NStZ-
RR 2007,90 and further references at MG § 261 Mn. 2.
10 All the laws mentioned in this paper and a number of translations into English of the
main acts of legislation in the form of their most recent amendments can be found on the
official website of the Bundesministerium der Justiz, the Federal Ministry of Justice, at
www.gesetze-im-internet.de. the latter under the tab "Translations". The translations
used in this paper are taken from that website and have been modified by the author
when necessary.
11 This paper will only look at criminal proceedings proper, not at the administrative
sanctions under the Ordnungswidrigkeitengesetz -OWiG, because those are no longer
considered criminal sanctions. See for the OWiG the commentary by Erich GöhlerlFranz
Gürtler/Helmut Seitz, Gesetz über Ordnungswidrigkeiten - OWiG, 15th ed., 2009.
12 See my Principles of German Criminal Law, 2009 (hereinafter POGCL), 10 ff, to
which the reader is referred for the details.
•
•
•
•
Grundgesetz - GG: The Basic Law or German Federal
Constitution, which lays the foundation for issues such as judicial
independence and civil liberties. The constitutions of the
individual member states of the Federation can also have an
impact on the application of the federallaw, although the general
rule is that the lowest rank of federal law breaks state
constitutionallaw, Art. 31 GG.14
European Convention on Human Rights: Directly applicable in
German law, has the same functions as the Human Rights Act
1998 in the UK.
Strafprozessordnung - StPO: The Code of Criminal Procedure
which contains the majority of the law related to the conduct of
criminal proceedings against adults.
Jugendgerichtsgesetz - JGG: Juvenile Courts Act, which regulates
the specific features of proceedings and sentences against
juveniles (14 - 18 years of age) and young adults (18 - 21 years of
age). It is noteworthy in this context that the criminal law is not
fully congruent with the civillaw on the consequences of coming
of age at 18: The civil law attaches the full canon of rights and
duties once a person reaches that age. There is no separate
treatment for the group between 18 and 21; the latter had for many
years been the age of majority in Germany. However, the juvenile
law operates, not uncontroversially, on the common sense
experience that (a) many people under 21 are still in the
developmental stages of a juvenile or that (b) the offence
sometimes carries a distinctly juvenile character, and that they
should consequently be given some leniency and be educated
rather than punished15• This has the consequence that adult
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criminallaw will normally apply to 18-year-olds unless one of the
two conditions just mentioned is made out.
Strafgesetzbuch - StGB: The Criminal Code makes provision for
the bulk of the sentencing law and for prerequisites to prosecution
such as requests to prosecute and limitation periods etc.
Gerichtsverfassungsgesetz - GVG - and EinjUhrungsgesetz zum
Gerichtsverfassungsgesetz - EGGVG: Courts Organisation Act
and its Introductory Act containing basic mIes on jurisdiction,
composition of courts, open justice etc.
There are further secondary pieces of legislation that exist now on the
Länder i.e. member state level after the 2006 Federalism Reform, namely
the law on the conditions of the detention on remand in criminal
proceedings, the Untersuchungshaftvollzug, and the law on conditions of
imprisonment, the Strafvollzug. Both of these were previously regulated
by federal laws but have now been devolved into the domain of the
individual Länder; at the time of writing not all of them had passed their
own state legislation but a number still applied the old federal law as
Land law for the time being. There are furthermore two sets of
regulations that are important for the administrative side of the work
mainly of the prosecution, the so-called Richtlinien jUr das Straf- und
Bußgeldverfahren - RiStBV - i.e. the Guidelines for Criminal and
Administrative Summary Fine Proceedings, and the Anordnung über
Mitteilungen in Strafsachen -MiStra - i.e. the Criminal Proceedings
(Transmission of Information) Ordinance. Both can be compared to a
kind of statutory instruments and were passed by the governments of the
Bund and the Länder. The law on criminal records is regulated by the
Bundeszentralregistergesetz (Federal Central Criminal Register Act).
these offences are typically sanctioned in written proceedings, the so-called
Strafbefehlsverfahren. This procedure is neither available against juveniles (§ 79(1)
JGG) nor against young adults if juvenile law is applied (§ 109(2) 1st sentence JGG).
Because of the mass of such cases many judges had resorted to a rather looser
appreciation of the developmental stage of the defendant in order to c1ear their docket.
Tbe Stages of Procedure
It is important to have a general grasp of the structure of the normal
procedure in German criminallaw, leaving aside some special procedures
which we cannot look at here for reasons of space. The normal flowchart
of a case is as follows, in a very simplified manner:
Within each of those stages, there are, of course, numerous fields of
interaction between the prosecution and the courts, for example, in the
investigation stage the prosecution may have to apply for arrest, search
and seizure, phone-tapping warrants etc., at trial it is within the discretion
of the prosecution whether to extend an indictment to facts newly
di.scovere~ during an ongoing trial under § 266 or to opt for aseparate
tnal, and m the enforcement stage it may have to present the dossier to
the court for decisions about early release etc.
Forms ofdecisions
One difficulty that arises when trying to present the German system to an
Anglophone audience is the lack of congruence between procedural
Terminological issues - The Different Forms of Decisions, Stages of
Legal Examination; the Offender at Different Stages of the
Proceedings
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18 MG Ein! Mn. 121 ff.
19 MG Ein! Mn. 121.
20 However, in the case of provisional discontinuances only to the extent that the offence
was prosecuted as a Vergehen (misdemeanour), not as a Verbrechen (felony). For the
distinction see POGCL, 27.
Why is all this important? Because the form adecision takes decides the
manner in which an appeal may be lodged against it: Urteile can
concepts. One of those issues is the various forms of decisions and how
they are described. In English, we have judgment, decision and order as
well as the generic expression of a ruling. A judgment usually doses an
instance, for example, after a trial or an appeal, adecision short of
judgment may rule on a motion by a party, allowing or denying it, and an
order usually expresses a command of the court to the parties or third
persons. All of these can also untechnically be called a ruling. German
law distinguishes along other lines that are not easily dassified: It knows
Urteile, Beschlüsse and Verfiigungen as well as the specific instrument of
the Strafbefehl; the generic term for all of these is Entscheidungen.
Urteile come dosest to the English judgments in that they are usually
meant to dose an instance based on a full trial18; any other decisions or
orders are issued by Beschluss. A Beschluss does not normally require an
oral hearing, but some decisions after an oral hearing are Beschlüsse. A
Beschluss may contain adecision and/or an order within the meaning
under English law. However, in some cases, the function of an Urteil can
be taken by a Beschluss, for example, in § 349(2) which allows the
appellate court in the Revision, i.e. the appeal on points of law, to dismiss
an appeal on the merits as obviously unfounded by Beschluss or in a case
of an obviously founded appeal to quash the lower court' s Urteil under §
349(4) by unanimous vote; adecision on the merits of an appeal against
an Urteil usually has to be passed by Urteil (see, for example, § 349(5)).
The Strafbefehl, adecision issued in purely written proceedings and
characterised by some commentators as a Beschluss19, can convict and
sentence a defendant to a fine or, ifhe is represented by counsel, even to a
suspended term of imprisonment not exceeding one year (§ 407(2) 2nd
sentence); yet once it has become final it has the force of an Urteil (§
410(3)). Similarly, the decision of the court to order a provisional
discontinuance of the proceedings under a condition in § 153a(2) 1st
sentence after an indictment and until the end of the trial (and even of an
appeal hearing on the facts) is given by Beschluss; if the defendant
complies with the condition the discontinuation becomes final and the
effects of double jeopardy attach (§ 153a(1) 5th sentence) as they would to
an Urteil.2o A Verfiigung is usually a purely internal decision by a judge
or prosecutor, for example, the decision of a prosecutor to indict a
defendant or to discontinue the proceedings, the so-called
Abschlussverfiigung.
[VOL. 1Basic Concepts ofGerman Criminal Procedure8
Juvenile Courts
16 § 103(2) 2nd sentence JGG allows for juveniles, and § 112 1st sentence JGG which
refers to §§ 102 -104 JGG for young adults, to be tried exceptionally before certain
courts that have specialist jurisdiction over adults if the juveniles/young adults are co-
defendants with adult defendants being tried before those courts and trying them
together appears advisable in order to establish the truth of the case or for other serious
reasons. § 104 JGG orders in those cases that for juveniles a number of provisions from
the JGG shall apply before the adult court and leaves it in the discretion of the court to
apply others from the JGG; however, § 112 2nd sentence JGG excludes the application of
the provisions referred to in § 104 JGG in the case ofyoung adults insofar as they would
not ordinarily apply to young adults.
17 The only exception are the specialist courts mentioned in the previous footnote, see §
47a 2nd sentence JGG which refers to § 103(2) 2nd and 3rd sentences JGG; the latter
states that these courts take precedence even before the juvenile chamber at the
Landgericht (District Court). See Chapter 3 on jurisdiction ratione materiae in my
forthcoming book (fn. 1) for more detail.
We have already seen that there exist specific regulations for the
proceedings against juveniles and young adults under the JGG, which are
to be conducted from the investigative stage with special reference to
educating the defendants, and not merely with a view to punishment (§ 2
JGG). The general provisions of the StGB and StPO only apply insofar as
the JGG does not provide otherwise (§ 2(2) JGG). The most obvious one
is that this category of defendant is (usually16) tried before special
juvenile courts, staffed (ideally) by judges, both lay and professional, and
prosecutors who have experience in dealing with young people; it is quite
another issue whether the juvenile court will apply substantive juvenile
criminal law to cases of young adult offenders as was indicated above.
Juvenile courts take precedence over adult courts of the same or lower
tiers (§ 47a 1st sentence JGG).17 Another major feature of the juvenile
procedure that has no equivalent in proceedings against adults is the
institution of the Jugendgerichtshilfe, the Juvenile Court Support Service
(§ 38 JGG). This service is an invaluable help for juvenile courts in that it
provides information about the defendant' s development and in the case
of a conviction, acts as a specialist probation service unless the court
appoints another person as probation officer. As far as sentencing is
concerned, the JGG contains its own arsenal of sanctions geared towards
the overall aim of educating rather than punishing the defendants.
typicalll i be attacked through the appellate avenues of Berufung (by way
of trial de novo) and Revision (appeal on points of law only), both of
which are time-limited, Beschlüsse are typically subject to the
Beschwerde (which may be time-limited and is then called sofortige
Beschwerde). Veifügungen as mainly internal acts are usually not subject
to appeal22. Indeed, ifthe court uses the wrong form, the proper appellate
remedy is in principle determined by the form it should have taken.23 For
example, if a court decides by Beschluss to discontinue a trial for apart of
the facts underlying the indictment because in its view the defendant is
not guilty of committing an offence based on those facts, the decision is
in fact a partial acquittal and is considered to be an Urteil. 24 It is thus easy
to see that the rhetorical question "What's in a name?" does not apply to
(German) legal terminology.
the merits. During the proceedings the question arose whether the
plaintiff actually had standing to bring such an action, an issue which
Lord Denning and with him the entire panel answered as follows:
A point was raised as to whether Mr. Blackbum has any standing to
come before the Court. That is not a matter upon which we need rule
upon today. He says that he feels very strongly and that it is a matter in
which many persons in this country are concemed. I would not myself
rule hirn out on the ground that he has no standing. But I do rule hirn out
on the ground that these Courts will not impugn the treaty-making
power of Her Majesty, and on the ground that insofar as Parliament
enacts legislation, we will deal with that legislation as and when it
arises.26
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Stages oflegal examination
A notable decision from recent British legal history is that of Blackbum v
Attomey-Generaz25, in which Mr Albert R. Blackbum filed an action to
prevent the UK from joining the Common Market by signing the Treaty
of Rome and thus giving up part of its sovereignty. The Court of Appeal,
per the then Master of the Rolls, Lord Denning, dismissed the action on
21 This is, for example, not true of the procedure under the OWiG, where an Urteil
dismissing an objection to a summary fme as inadmissible is subject to the
Rechtsbeschwerde, Le. a Beschwerde on points of law only; § 79(1) 1st sentence No. 4
OWiG.
22 There is a major exception for the most important Verjügung of the prosecution, the
above-mentioned Abschlussverjügung Le. the decision under § 170 whether to indict or
discontinue the proceedings. The decision to indict is not subject to appeal, neither is the
trial court's decision to admit the indictment for trial (§ 201(1», however, the decision
not to indict can be reviewed by the so-called Klageerzwingungsveljahren under § 172
which consists of a two-tier process, fIrst arequest to the senior prosecutor to order his
subordinate to indict, and in the case of the former's refusal to do so, an application to
the Oberlandesgericht to order the prosecution to indict. - There is a more general
discussion about whether such Verfügungen can be the object of arequest for judicial
review under § 23 EGGVG if they have some form of external effect and may infringe
the rights of the defendant or other parties and much here is still controversial; see the
commentary in MG § 23 EGGVG.
23 MG Einl Mn. 122. - The ensuing question of how to treat an appeal that takes the
right form for the decision as it has been issued, but not for the form in which it should
have been issued, is usually solved by the application of the Meistbegünstigungsprinzip,
Le. the principle ofproviding maximum effect to a party's procedural declarations ifthe
error is the court's rather than the party's; see BGH MDR2009, 1000.
24 BGH JZ 1963, 714; see also BGHSt 15, 259. - This must be distinguished from the
situation under § 300 which requires the court to interpret a declaration by the defendant
aimed at reviewing a ruling in a manner to give it maximum effect as the proper remedy,
Le. if someone wrongly fIles a Beschwerde against an Urteil, the court must interpret
this as either a Berufung or a Revision. The two scenarios may, of course, overlap; see
Karslruher Kommentar zur StrafProzessordnung, 6th ed., 2008 (hereinafter KK)-Paul §
300 Mn. 1-3.
25 [1971] EWCA Civ 7.
This approach, which matches what another common law judge, David
Hunt, said about the function of procedural mIes in the context of the
international criminal justice system27, would be anathema to a German
judge. German law, not that different from English law on this issue in
principle, knows of the distinction of whether an application, request,
action, appeal etc. is admissible (zulässig) or inadmissible (unzulässig), or
whether it is well-founded on the merits (begründet) or not
(unbegründet).28 However, where an Englishjudge such as Lord Denning
might view it as an expression of pettiness to stop a case, especially one
as important as the Blackbum litigation, on a technicality such as standing
(locus standi), that is exact1y what any German judge would do regardless
of the nature of the case. The rationale is, on the one hand, that the courts
can only exercise their powers to the extent that the constitution and the
laws made by Parliament allow them to do so, and laws setting out
formalities in the judicial process count among them. German law, and
with it many continentallegal systems, does not subscribe to the concept
of an inherent judicial power that is not derived from some external
source but emanates from the judicial function qua natura.29 Cases such
as, for example, the US Supreme Court decision in Chambers v NASCO,
Inc. 3o that allow such inherent powers to function even in the face of
express legislation have no counterpart in German law. Apart from this
purely doctrinal issue, on the other hand, the distinction also has effects in
the realm of res judicata: If an application, for example, has been rejected
as inadmissible it may be repeated once the criteria for admissibility have
been complied with; if it is dismissed on the merits the applicant is
26 Ibid. (fn. 26).
27 See POGCL, 7 f.
28 The declaration of an appeal as either unzulässig or unbegründet also has an effect on
the terminology of the decision dismissing it: Inadmissible appeals are verworfen,
unfounded appeals are zurückgewiesen; see, for example, §§ 346(1),349(1).
29 See Michael Bohlander, International Criminal Tribunals and their Power to Punish
Contempt and False Testimony (2001) Criminal Law Forum, 91.
30 See 501 D.S. 32 (1991).
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exc1uded from proceeding with a fresh application based on the same
facts.
The position 0/the offender at different stages in the proccedings
Depending on the stage at which a (potential) offender finds himself in
the process, he is given a different name. Before the prosecution indicts a
person, he is called the Beschuldigte. After indictment, but before
admission of the indictment, he is called the Angeschuldigte, and after the
admission ofthe indictment, his name is the Angeklagte.31 The use ofthe
terms is apparent from the provisions of the StPO in the different stages
of the proceedings. The translation is relatively straightforward without
causing too much potential for confusion: Beschuldigter is translated by
"suspect", Angeschuldigter by "accused" and Angeklagter by
"defendant".32
The Major Procedural Maxims - An Overview
Every legal system is driven by some axiomatic principles or maxims that
determine its overall shape, the practice of the courts and the academic
treatment of problematic scenarios. It will be he1pful for the reader to
have an outline of a number of rules that make up the character of
German criminal procedure; they are not exhaustive but represent the
main facets required to understand the ensuing discussion. One can
loosely categorise them as constitutional principles that have found a
specific outlet in criminal procedure, and as systemic procedural
principles, but there is a certain conceptual overlap between both
categories.33
Constitutional Principles
Judicial independence
This is an obvious feature to which almost all countries of this world
subscribe, at least on the paper of their constitutions. In Germany, it was
31 Note, however, that an offender who is not indicted but against whom a procedure
with the aim of sequestering him in amental health institution or in custodial addiction
therapy is instituted (Sicherungsverfahren, §§ 413 - 416; Unterbringungssachen, § 171a
GVG) is always called the Beschuldigte.
32 Note, however, that international criminal courts tend to call the offender the
"accused" after indictment.
33 So, for example, the overview in KK.-PfeifferlHannich Einleitung Parts H. and III.
historically introduced in order to block attempts by the monarch34 at
interfering with the judicial sphere35 (so-called Kabinettsjustiz - cabinet
justice) and is not to be understood as a privilege of the judiciary.36 Its
aim is to protect the judiciary from outside interference and to make it
subject only to the law. It has two facets, personal independence
(persönliche Unabhängigkeit) and independence in judicial decision-
making (sachliche Unabhängigkeit). The latter has been enshrined in the
constitution in Art. 97(1) GG:
Judges shall be independent and subject only to the law.
A major facet of this rule is that German judges are not bound by
precedent; there is no stare decisis doctrine and any judge at an
Amtsgericht (AG) may deviate from the consistent jursiprudence of the
BGH and even of the Federal Constitutional Court, unless the latter's
decision has the force of an Act of Parliament under § 31 BVerfGG. A
binding effect exists only in an individual case along the avenues of
appeal.37 This applies equally to professional and lay judges.
Because independence in decision-making realistically depends on not
having to worry about the consequences of one's decisions, Art. 97(2)
GG provides corresponding protection to professional judges:
Judges appointed permanently to full-time positions may be
involuntarily dismissed, permanently or temporarily suspended,
transferred or retired before the expiration of their term of office
only by virtue of judicial decision and only for the reasons and
in the manner specified by the laws. The legislature may set age
limits for the retirement ofjudges appointed for life. In the event
of changes in the structure of courts or in their districts, judges
may be transferred to another court or removed from office,
provided they retain their full salary.
A corollary to protecting judicial independence against personal bias are
the provisions on recusal in §§ 22 - 31. Furthermore, the German
34 In recent times such interference has been replaced by that of the Government; see for
recent attempts in Germany Michael Bohlander, Flexible Judges or Flexing the Political
Muscle? in Leny De Groot-van LeeuwenIWannes Rombouts (eds.) Separation of
Powers in Theory and Practice - An International Perspective, 2010,123.
35 KK.-PfeifferlHannich Einleitung Mn. 24.
36 BGH NStZ 2001,651.
37 Not even the decisions of the Great Senates or the Joint Great Senates of the BGH
under § 132 GVG (MG § 132 GVG Mn. 18 - 20) or those of the Joint Senate of the
Federal Supreme Courts under Art. 95(3) GG and the Gesetz zur Wahrung der
Einheitlichkeit der Rechtsprechung der obersten Gerichtshöfe des Bundes of 19 June
1968 (BGBl. I (1968), 661 as amended by BGBl. I (2001), 1510), i.e. the Federa1
Supreme Courts (Uniformity of Jurisprudence) Act, are binding on any court but the
ones in the individual case; see § 16 of the 1968 Act. - Oniine at: www.gesetze-im-
internet.delbundesrechtl spreinhg/gesamt.pdf.
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understanding of independence has a direct impact on the professional
evaluation of judges, for example, for the purposes of granting them life
tenure or promotion: Any comments that touch upon, however slightly,
the actual work of a judge, his legal views and practice, his reversal rate
by the appellate courts etc. are highly problematic and can be questioned
before the administrative courts and the special judicial disciplinary
tribunal, the Richterdienstgericht.38 The position of the judiciary has been
set out in the Deutsches Richtergesetz - DRiG - (German Judiciary Act)
which contains regulations for the federal judiciary and certain
framework mIes for all judges, and the corresponding state laws enacted
in pursuance of Art. 98(3) GG for the state judiciaries.
The right to a predeterminedjudge (Gesetzlicher Richter)
Judicial business needs to be allocated in a fashion that exc1udes to the
greatest extent possible any kind of horse-trading as to who sits on which
case. It is obvious that a party may have a strong interest in getting a
judge they know is favourably disposed towards their position. Likewise,
scenes sometimes seen in American courtroom movies where one judge
offers to take a case off a colleague because the latter wants to go on
vacation or attend a conference etc. can give rise to additional concems
about judicial docket-swapping. The German constitution outlaws both
scenarios in Art. 101(1) 2n sentence GG:
No one may be removed from the jurisdiction of his lawful
judge.
This has traditionally been held to mean that the methods of case
assignment (Geschäftsverteilung - see for more detail on the procedure
§§ 21a - 21j GVG) in any individual courts must be so exact and
comprehensive as to ensure that any case fmds its way to the proper judge
"blindly".39 To this end, courts must draw up annual case allocation plans
(Geschäftsverteilungspläne) which may run into dozens or hundreds of
pages depending on the size of the court40. They must consider any
eventuality, for example, who takes over if a judge falls i11 for a longer
period of time. These plans are public record and can be - and regularly
are - inspected by defence counsel to prepare motions for a change in the
panel. If accompanied by a certain degree of arbitrariness as opposed to a
genuine error by the court, their violation can also have an effect on an
appeal based on the unlawful composition ofthe panel under § 338 NO.l
38 BGHZ 100,271 and with further references KK-Pfeiffer/Hannich Einleitung Mn. 24.
39 BVerfGE 40,356; 95, 322.
40 The 2010 case assignment plan for the LandgerichtBerlin, for example, has 147 pages
and can be accessed at:
www.berlin.de/imperia/md/content/senatsverwaltungen/justiz/gerichte/landgericht/
gvpl_2010_08_16.pdf?download.html.
and may result in the reversal of Urteile by courts that have assumed
jurisdiction by grossly neglecting the statutory mIes on jurisdiction.41
This restriction must be seen in connection with §§ 20 StPO and 22d
GVG which state that the mere fact that a court has no jurisdiction ratione
loci42 or that a judge decided a matter who was not meant to do so under a
valid43 case allocation plan does not make their actions invalid44, unless
the violation obviously and glaringly violated the mIes onjurisdiction.45
The right to be heard (Rechtliches Gehör)
Art. 103(1) GG states:
In the courts every person shall be entitled to a hearing in
accordance with the law.
This means on the one hand that every person must get a chance to state
their views in judicial proceedings, orally or in writing, and that any
decision taken without affording them such an opportunity runs the risk
of being quashed as unconstitutional. On the other hand it entails the duty
of the court to advise the parties of any legal points it intends to base its
decision upon if these are so far outside of what can be expected by a
well-informed and diligent party that it would amount to a trial by
ambush by the COurt.46 The decision of the court must show that it
engaged with the relevant47 arguments put forward by a party; if this is
not the case the decision may violate Art. 103(1) GG and be reversed.48
Similarly, courts must not use facts known to them but not to the
defendant in order to arrive at adecision that is to his disadvantage, an
issue ~articularly relevant in proceedings for terrorism and organised
crime. 9 If a judge in a certain case indicates, for fear or existence of bias
or based on an exc1usion by law, through a statement to the other judges
of his chamber or another judge in charge of recusal matters, that he may
be prevented from sitting on that case, his statement must be disc10sed to
the parties so they can comment upon it.50 This constitutional right has
41 See BGHSt 38,212 and KK-Pfeiffer/Hannich Einleitung Mn. 25.
42 The principle does not apply to violations of the rules on jurisdiction ratione materiae
other than case allocation plans; OLG Köln StV 2004, 417.
43 The rule does not apply to allocation plans that are legally flawed; MG § 22d GVG
Mn. 1.
44 MG § 20 Mn. 1- 3; § 22dGVG Mn. 1.
45 MG § 20 Mn. 1.
46 BVerfGE 84, 188.
47 Although not necessarily each and every one even if they are abstruse and entirely off
the mark: BVerfGE 47,182.
48 BVerfGE 51,129; NJW 1992, 2877.
49 BVerfGE 63, 45.
50 BVerfGE 89, 28.
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been taken up in many provisions ofthe StPO, such as §§ 33,230,243(4),
257,258 etc.
The right to a fair trial
This right, which covers many different aspects of criminal proceedings
and is in a way the basic right underlying almost all others, is guaranteed
by Art. 20(3) on the Rechtsstaat principle (state based on the rule of law)
together with the general personal freedom right in 2(1) GG.51 Its
underlying rationale is to ensure that a person is not made a mere object
of the proceedings but retains a way of engaging actively in them.52 For
Germany, the right has been given concrete shape in the StPO and the
corresponding parliamentary legislation, including the ECHR and mainly
its Art. 6. In practice, the right has been held to constitute a rule of
interpretation to be applied by the courts to the existing law rather than a
vehicle of creating new legal interests; in a democracy it should be used
with great care because it is primarily for the democratically elected
legislature to flesh out such general principles and there may be several
equally acceptable ways of reaching that goal.53 Violations of the right to
a fair trial do not necessarily lead to a procedural bar, but may have the
consequence of a substantial reduction in sentence, as, for example, in the
case of the prosecution reneging on an assurance not to prosecute54 or in
the well-known scenario of entrapment by undercover agents
provocateurs.55 The principle also has had a major effect in the context of
plea bargaining, which after a long period of being based purelyon case
law was finally codified in § 257c.56 Another im~ortant area of
application is the right to the assistance of counsel 7 and to legal
representation on the basis of free legal aid in the case of indigent
persons.58
51 BVerfGE 77,65.
52 BVerfGE 63, 45. - See also from a literary point of view the famous work by Franz
Kafka, The Trial. Kafka describes the experiences of Josef K. who wakes up one
moming and fmds himself under arrest for a crime he did not commit and the nature of
which is never revealed to him during the entire - and bizarre - proceedings.
53 BGHSt 24,124; 49,112; NStZ 1984,274; BVerfGE 57,250.
54 BGHSt 37, 10.
55 BGHSt 45,321; 47, 44 and see now the regulation ofthe conditions for their use in §§
1l0a-llOc.
56 Note, however, that § 257c(2) 3rd sentence clearly states that there must be no charge
bargaining and that measures of rehabilitation and incapacitation (§§ 61 - 72 StGB)
cannot be made the object of a bargain.
57 BVerfGE 38,105.
58 BVerfGE 46,202; 56,185.
The presumption ofinnocence (Unschuldsvermutung)
As already indicated above, this is one of the foundation pillars of any
criminal justice system worthy of the name. It is also based on the
Rechtsstaat concept and thus has constitutional rank, despite the fact that
it also applies on the level of simple federallaw through Art. 6(2) ECHR.
The Federal Constitutional Court has developed a practice of using the
ECHR to interpret the German domestic constitutional concept of the
presumption of innocence based on the specific significance of the
Convention for the relationship between its human rights and the German
constitution's civil liberties (Grundrechte).59 The presumption has a
connection to the principle in dubio pro reo, yet there are slight
differences in that the in dubio rule is triggered only after the court has
evaluated all the available evidence before it and must then weigh any
gaps in favour of the suspect, accused or defendant, whereas the
presumption in German understanding applies irrespectively of that at all
stages of the proceedings until the conviction has become fmal through
exhaustion of the entire appeals process.60 Equally, a defendant is not
required to prove, for example, an alibi but she may do so and a failure to
prove it does not automatically mean that she is guilty.61 In other words,
the absence of exculpating evidence is not equal to the presence of
incriminating evidence.62 However, the presumption naturally does not
prevent measures such as arrest, search and seizure etc. which merely
require a certain degree ofsuspicion instead of certainty.63
The principle ofproportionality (Grundsatz der Verhältnismäßigkeit and
Übermaßverbot)
Also derived from the Rechtsstaat principle in Art. 20(3) GG, this
principle states that any intrusion by the state into the rights of an
individual must only use the least burdensome means necessary to
achieve a legitimate objective and that the individual must be overall
subject to a legitimate expectation to suffer the intrusion even if it is of
such a character (Zumutbarkeit).64 Like the right to a fair trial this rule has
been broken down into specific provisions related to the different stages
of the proceedings, such as the taking of (intimate) sampies from the
suspect, arrest and detention, and similar sentiments as above apply. In
59 BVerfGE 74, 358.
60 BVerfGE 32, 202; BGH NStZ 1999, 205; KK-PfeifferlHannich Einleitung Mn. 32a.
61 Examp1e used by KK-PfeifferlHannich Einleitung Mn. 32a.
62 BGHSt 41, 153.
63 BVerfG NJW 1990, 2741. - For the problem of whether the defendant can be
burdened with his own expenses in the case of a discontinuance (he can) see KK-
PfeifferlHannich, Einleitung Mn. 32a with further references.
64 Consistent jurisprudence of the Federa1 Constitutional Court: BVerfGE 17, 108; 20,
162;35,382;37,167;44,353;67,157; 110,226.
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practice, proportionality will often be detennined by the seriousness of
the charge and the strength of evidence underlying the suspicion at any
given time. However, even acharge of murder or of other serious
offences in and of itse1f is, for example, not a sufficient reason to remand
a suspect in custody pending trial if none of the usual reasons for denying
bail exist: The introduction of the provision of § 112(3) which did away
with the requirement to establish a risk of flight or tampering with
evidence etc. in cases of serious crime in order to detain a suspect was
held to be unconstitutional qua lack of proportionality if literally applied
and was consequently read down by the Federal Constitutional Court to
inc1ude such a requirement, although it conceded that in cases of such
serious offences the degree of justification in an arrest warrant was for
obvious reasons not as high as that for medium level crime under the
usual criteria.65 In fact, in many cases an arrest warrant may be based on
flight risk because of the severe punishment the suspect can expect and
the court may thus circumvent the problems of subsection (3).66
The judicial duty ofcare (Gerichtliche Fürsorgepjlicht)
This is a kind of ancillary duty based on a variety of constitutional
axiomata such as the right to a fair trial and the principle of a socially
oriented state based on the role oflaw (sozialer Rechtsstaat) (Arts. 20(1),
28 GG). It supplements the right to a fair trial in asking judges to assist
especially undefended and inexperienced pro-se defendants in the proper
exercise of their rights, and to abstain from exploiting their position by
asking them, for example, to dec1are a waiver of appeal by telling them
that they got away with a black eye etc., with the judge thus avoiding the
need for a fully reasoned Urteil. 67 It mayaiso mean re-opening the
hearing if a co-defendant makes an unexpected confession in his last
word (§ 258(2» before judgment is pronounced to allow the other co-
defendant(s) to react to this and consult with their counsel.68 Other cases
inc1ude the court looking for a therapy placement for a drug addict who is
willing to go into therapl9 or making the best effort to arrange a hearing
date at which counsel of the defendant's trust can attend.70 Finally, the
duty of care also covers third persons such as witnesses in need of
support.71
65 BVerfGE 19,342.
66 MG § 112 Mn. 37 - 39.
67 KK-Pfeiffer/Hannich Einleitung Mn. 32.
68 See the decision by the BGH of 11 June 1975, Docket No. 2 StR 88/75.
69 BGH NJW 1991,3289.
70 BGH NJW 1992, 849.
71 BGH NStZ 1984, 31.
Ne bis in idem - Strafklageverbrauch
A feature of most modem criminal justice systems is the role that a
person should not be prosecuted or tried twice for the same72 offence73. In
its proper meaning, the principle refers to successive prosecutions, not to
simultaneous prosecution under multiple legal characterisations of the
same conduce4• In Gennan law, the ne bis in idem role, also called the
ban on double jeopardy or autrefois convict or aqcuit
(Strafklageverbrauch), is a constitutional fundamental righe5 intricately
connected to the finality of adecision (formelle Rechtskraft) and the
ensuing effect of res judicata (materielle Rechtskraft): Unless adecision
is fmal, res judicata is not triggered76. Note that only the operative parts
of the decision partake of that effect, not the reasons of a judgment; for
example, another judge, be it in civil or criminal proceedings, is free to
deviate from the views of the previous court on the facts recorded therein
as established, unless the law expressly states otherwise77• Of course, the
facts in the decision related to the time and place and modus operandi of
the offence detennine which conduct is blocked from a new prosecution
under a different legal characterisation; the Gennan law attaches ne bis in
idem to the same facts, not their legal characterisation. Note that only a
decision on the merits78 blocks a new prosecution, not one based on
procedural matters; if the procedural obstac1e is removed, re-prosecution
is possible79. The ban is not triggered by decisions of foreign courts,
72 A conviction or acquittal for a summary offence (Ordnungswidrigkeit) also triggers ne
bis in idem for a re-prosecution as a criminal offence and vice-versa; § 84 OWiG. Note
that a sanction for a disciplinary offence does not bar a prosecution for a connected
criminal offence based on the same conduct, but that an acquittal from a criminal charge
blocks a disciplinary sanction unless there is another aspect to the conduct that is
distinguishable from the criminal charge; there may, however, have to be credit given in
the sentencing decision. See MG Einl Mn. 178 - 179.
73 See for the restricted application of the principle in the international and transnational
context Michael Bohlander, Ne bis in idem, in Cherif M. Bassiouni (ed.) International
Criminal Law, Vol. III, 3rd ed., 2008, 541.
74 There was initially some confusion about this in international criminallaw; ibid. (fn.
74).
75 BVerfGE 9,89; 23,191.
76 MG Einl Mn. 168. - However, while a case is pending before one court, the
procedural bar of litis pendens (Rechtshängigkeit) exists, which prevents another court
from dealing with the case; see MG Einl Mn 145.
77 MG Einl Mn. 170 with references to the case law. One example is § 190 2nd sentence
StGB on proof of truth by judgment in cases of libel, where the libel consists of the
allegation that the libelled person had committed an offence: Ifthe libel victim had been
finally acquitted of the alleged offence before the allegation was made, the defendant
can no longer adduce evidence to prove that the allegation was true nonetheless.
78 Specific problems exist with regard to the extent of the bar in cases of continuous or
serial offences (Dauerdelikte andjortgesetzte Handlung) where individual acts may be
prosecuted before the overall pattern becomes known and vice-versa; see on the complex
issue MG Einl Mn. 175 -175a
79 MG Einl Mn. 172 with references.
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unless there is a duty to take them into account under international or
bilateral agreements80.
Systemic Principles
Accusatory Principle (Anklagegrundsatz)
This principle states the simple fact that under German law a court cannot
seize itself of a matter unless an external prosecution, request etc. is
brought. This applies, with the exception of minor contempt issues81,
even if a serious offence is committed in front of the judge in a sitting.82
The prosecution must file an indictment under § 151 before a court can
proceed to a trial; the court is under a duty to check at all stages of the
proceedings whether a proper indictment exists.83 The indictment
determines the ambit of the court's examination, as is evidenced by §§
155(1),264 - 266. The procedure under § 172 described above84 is not an
exception but merely serves as a check on the prosecution's quasi-
monopoll5 to indict persons before the courts.86
Principle o/public prosecution (OjJizialprinzip)
As a corollary to the accusatory principle, the OjJizialprinzip puts the
power to prosecute and indict in the hands of the public prosecution
service which has to prosecute without having to abide by the wishes of
the victim. There is thus no automatism in Germany that a prosecution
will not ensue if the victim does not "press charges", as the reader may
have seen many times especially in American films. There are a few
exceptions that mainly deal with minor offences where the victim (a)
must either formally request prosecution, the so-called Antragsdelikte87,
or (b) may prosecute the offence herself (§ 374 - Privatklage)88, or (c)
80 MG Einl Mn. 177 - 177c.
81 See §§ 176-178 GVG.
82 She will have to refer the case to the prosecution under § 183 GVG, after recording
what happened and, if need be, arresting the offender provisionally under §§ 127, 128-
she cannot, however, issue an arrest warrant based on § 112 because she lacks
jurisdiction for that; see OLG Hamm NJW 1949, 191; MG § 183 GVG Mn. 1 - 2.
83 BGHSt 5, 225.
84 Fn. 23.
85 Leaving aside the institution of the Privatklage (private prosecution) for minor
offences under §§ 374 - 394.
86 KK-PfeifferlHannich Einleitung Mn. 3.
87 For example, minor cases oftrespass, insults etc. See KK-PfeifferlHannich Einleitung
Mn. 4 for further examples.
88 The prosecution may, however, at any stage of the proceedings join the private
prosecutor or take over the case completely (§ 377). If it does take it over, which it will
normally only do if it is in the public interest (see § 376), the proceedings change their
where certain persons such as civil service superiors and line managers,
political organs, foreign States etc. have the discretion to request
prosecution or not (so-called Ermächtigungsdelikte).89
Principles 0/mandatory and discretionary prosecution (Legalitätsprinzip
and Opportunitätsprinzip)
The monopoly given to the prosecution to decide whom to prosecute
requires a corrective mechanism to ensure that there are no arbitrary
choices being made. This is established in § 152(2) which requires the
prosecution in principle to investigate, prosecute and indict any offence
for which sufficient evidence exists. German doctrine therefore takes the
opposite approach from that of England and Wales, famously expressed
in 1951 by the former Attorney-General Sir Hartley Shawcross who
stated that "[i]t has never been the role in this country - I hope it never
will be - that suspected criminal offences must automatically be the
subject of prosecution". He added that a prosecution should occur
"wherever it appears that the offence or the circumstances of its
commission is or are of such a character that a prosecution in respect
thereof is required in the public interest".90 However, as with so many
things doctrinal, theory and practice are two different things. In England
and Wales, the institution of private prosecution exists as it does in
Germany (although in a somewhat different form), and it is subject to
similar checks by requiring the consent of the DPP for some offences and
empowering the DPP to take over any criminal proceedings and, if
necessary, discontinue them.91 The basic role in Germany has been
watered down considerably by the introduction of §§ 153 ffwhich allow
the prosecution and the courts to discontinue proceedings for minor
offences if in their discretion it is opportune to stop the case
(Opportunitätsprinzip) because the guilt of the offender is of a minor
nature and/or may be sufficiently sanctioned by way of a conditionial
nature and transmogrify into normal proceedings as if upon indictment, with the
consequence that the private prosecutor is no longer a party to them unless he joins the
prosecution as a Nebenkläger under the criteria set out in §§ 395 - 402. This also means
that the prosecution and the court can discontinue the proceedings under §§ 153 ff
without the consent of the prior private prosecutor or the Nebenkläger; the Nebenkläger
must, however, be heard before a discontinuance is issued which is why a court
intending to discontinue the proceedings under §§ 153(2), 153(a)(2), 153b(2) and
154(2) must frrst decide whether a person is allowed to join the prosecution and hear
them before ordering the discontinuance; MG § 396 Mn. 18.
89 For examples see See KK-PfeifferlHannich Einleitung Mn. 4.
90 House ofCommons Debates, vol. 483, 29 January 1951.
91 S. 6 Prosecution ofOffences Act 1985; see for furtherreference Hungerford-Welch,
134-136.
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discontinuance. The following table92 shows the actual numbersof how
cases are processed in the Amtsgericht and Landgericht jurisdictions:
Table 1: Cases dealt with by the prosecution service - All of Germany, 2006
Total number of cases 4,876,989
Indictment 560,427 11,5 %
Strafbefehl 581,713 11,9%
Conditional discontinuance 241,102 4,9%
Unconditional discontinuance 1.053,654 21,6%
Insufficient evidence discontinuance 1,293,152 26,5%
Death of suspect, lack of responsibilitv 8,651 0,2%
Other 1,138,299 23,3 %
The large category of other disposals inc1uded referrals to another
prosecution service, to administrative proceedings, juvenile proceedings,
provisional discontinuances, joinder with other cases etc. The important
information as far as adult proceedings are concemed is that of the purely
criminal charges only 23,4 % were actually either indicted formally or by
way of a written Strafbefehl, with the latter again being applied more
often than the formal indictment; one can almost say that the Strafbefehl
has become a kind of secondary diversion instrument by sparing the
accused the spectac1e of an open trial unless she objects and chooses to
contest it. 26,5 % of cases were dealt with by discontinuances under §§
153 ff and most of those were unconditional ones. Once a case goes to
court, the picture changes somewhat, but there is still a high proportion of
discontinuances, as is evidenced by Table 2.93
Table 2: Cases dealt with by the courts -All ofGermany, 2006
Total number of defendants 976,600
Urteil (including acquittals) 461,274 47,2%
Strafbefehl 25,835 2,6%
Conditional discontinuance 124,083 12,7%
Unconditional discontinuance 100,994 10,3 %
Other discontinuance/discharge 28,327 2,9%
Other disposal 236,087 24,2%
The other discontinuances/discharges inc1uded cases of extradition,
expulsion, absence of the defendant and procedural bars. The other
disposals inc1uded combination with another case (119,532), withdrawal
92 Taken from Jörg-Martin Jehle, Criminal Justice in Germany, 5th ed., 2009, 20. -
Available on the website of the Federal Ministry of Justice at
www.bmj.bund.de/enid/9d342b183e63ged913ef2e1fc5c3c018.0/
Publications/Criminal_Justice_in_Germany_19x.htm1.
93 Ibid., 26.
of a private prosecution or of an appeal (61,155), referral to another court
and refusal by the trial court to admit the indictment for trial. Again, 23%
of the cases that had made it to the court were dealt with by a
discontinuance under §§ 153 ff. It is thus c1ear from the statistics that in
practice the Legalitätsprinzip has already been replaced as the guiding
principle. It now merely means that the prosecution has to start an
investigation if sufficient facts warrant it, but that a formal prosecution by
indictment or Strafbefehl occurs only in about a quarter of all cases.
Inquisitorial principle (Ermittlungsgrundsatz)
The major feature that justifies calling Germany an inquisitorial system is
the rule that the aim of any investigation and trial is the ascertainment of
the material truth (materielle Wahrheit), not the truth based on facts
adduced by the prosecution and defence. The court is not bound by any
dec1arations ofthe parties and investigates the facts on its own motion (§§
155(2) and 244(2)). German procedure is not party-driven, despite the
fact that the German term for the prosecution service, Staatsanwaltschaft,
is somewhat unfortunate in that it means State Attomey Service and could
thus lead one to think that the prosecution only represents the one-sided
interests of the state as a party. While in practice some prosecutors (and
judges) may and do, of course, develop a prosecution-minded attitude94,
the law is opposed to such partisan approaches. The principle applies to
the prosecution in the form of § 160(2) which expressly states that the
prosecution must equally investigate the incriminating and exculpatory
facts of a case, a provision which has led some to call the German
prosecution service the "most objective authority in the world"
(objektivste Behörde der Welt).95 In the case of a court this can mean, for
example, that a judge will order the police or the prosecution to
investigate a certain set of facts if they have come up during the
94 This can take rather extreme forms: A former judicial colleague of mine actually
affmned in a private conversation once that he did not think the police indulge in any
sort ofmisconduct during the investigations.
95 They make implicit, but questionable reference to a statement by Franz von Liszt
made to the Berliner Anwaltsverein on 23 March 1901, when he said, quite to the
contrary: ''[...] die Parteistellung der Staatsanwaltschaft ist durch unsere Prozeßordnung
besonders verdunkelt worden. Durch die Aufstellung des Legalitätsprinzips, durch die
dem Staatsanwalt auferlegte Verpflichtung in gleicher Weise Entlastungs- wie
Belastungsmomente zu prüfen, könnte ein bloßer Civiljurist [...] zu der Annahme
verleitet werden, als wäre die Staatsanwaltschaft nicht Partei, sondern die objektivste
Behörde der Welt."; DJZ 1901, 179. As a matter of fact, the powers of the
Staatsanwaltschaft continued to increase even in 1975 with the removal ofthe so-called
gerichtliche Voruntersuchung, Le. the judicial investigation, and came to be seen - and
used - shortly after the time of its introduction in the first half of the 19th century as a
medium of political influence by the governments in Prussia and the other German
states, in order to counter the inevitable advance of the idea of judicial independence;
see Thomas Vormbaum, Einfiihrung in die moderne Strafrechtsgeschichte, 2009,92 ff.
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Zwischen- or Hauptveifahren and had not been examined by the
prosecution.96 Presentation 0/ evidence(Unmittelbarkeitsprinzip)
be/ore the deciding judges
Principle 0/oralpresentation 0/evidence (Mündlichkeitsprinzip)
The court may under this rule only use the evidence for its decision which
was orally presented and discussed in the hearing before it. Despite the
fact that this principle has not been expressly enunciated in the StPO the
courts have consistently interpreted various provisions such as §§ 250,
261, 264 and § 169 GVG that refer to the Vernehmung (interrogation) of
witnesses or the Verhandlung (hearing) as meaning an oral hearing. 97
This is also an expression, on the one hand, of the German approach to
the concept of open justice, enshrined, for example, in § 169 GVG, which
is intended to allow the audience to follow the flow of the evidential
presentation and to ensure that the work of the courts is not done away
from the eye ofpublic scrutiny, and on the other hand it serves to ensure
that the parties to the proceedings know on which pieces of evidence the
court will be able to base its decision.98 The consequence is that, for
example, the full text of documents presented in evidence must be read
out and not mgerely be presented as exhibits, unless they are, for example,
very lengthy and the procedure under § 249(2) (Selbstleseveifahren _
private reading procedure) is chosen which allows the judges100 to take
notice of a document by simply reading it, if all the parties have had a
chance to read it as well. 101 In such cases, and where the defendant is not
put at a disadvantage, the efficiency and expediency of the trial
proceedings obviously should be given precedence over the information
interest ofthe public.
96 KK-PfeifferlHannich Einleitung Mn. 7.
97 BGH NStZ 1990,228.
98 KK-PfeifferlHannich Einleitung Mn. 8.
99 Possibly even entire books, see BGH NStZ 2000,307.
100 Including the lay judges, BGH NStZ 2005, 160.
101 The German law thus differs substantially, for example, from the Dutch approach,
which allows to a larger extent the direct use of pre-trial statements (processen-verbaal)
made to the police etc. as evidence at trial; see Art. 344 of the Wetboek van
Strafvordering (Code of Criminal Procedure) and the pertinent commentary in Berend
Keulen/Geert Knigge, StrafProcesrecht, 12th ed., 2010, 499; but see §§ 420,411(2) 2nd
sentence for the expedited and Strafbefehl procedures. - Note also the human rights
issue under Art. 6(1) ECHR in the case of lay judges reading potentially incriminating
material (essential result of the investigations in the indictment related to a prior co-
defendant who had made a confession and referred to that part of the indicment for the
content of her confession) in another but related proceeding, which was, however, not
submitted in the trial of the present defendant, unless clear measures are taken by the
court to ensure that the lay judges are aware of the evidential impact or lack thereof on
the trial at hand; see ECtHR, Elezi v. Germany, Judgment of 12 June 2008, Application
No. 26771103 (no violation) and BGHSt 43,360 (no violation).
§§ 240 and 250 together with Article 6(3)(d) ECHR require all evidence
to be presented directly to the judges who will decide the case. § 261
further restricts the presentation to the hearing and thus excludes in
principle the use of evidence not adduced at the hearing; to this extent
there is an overlap with the oral presentation principle. The
Unmittelbarkeitsprinzip also prohibits the court from delegating the
taking of evidence to third persons not involved in the fmal decision-
making process. A court may, in the course of a regular trial102, thus not
instruct another official to visit, for example, a witness living abroad or in
hospital in another city and take her statement, and then use the record of
that official as evidence, unless the conditions for a so-called
kommissarische Beweisaufnahme (commissary taking of evidence) under
§§ 223 - 225 are fulfilled. These allow for a judge to hear witnesses and
experts if for reasons of illness, disability or old age they cannot artend
the trial, or to carry out an inspection on behalf of the court. The law
distinguishes between the beauftragter Richter &commissioned judge)
who is always a member of the panel103 seizedlO of the case, and the
ersuchter Richter (requested judge) who is usually a judge of another
court at the place of residence of the witness or expert, or where the
inspection is to be taken. The principle has also been interpreted to
support the precedence of personal evidence (witnesses, experts) over .
documentary evidence and is thus related to the "best evidence rule". 105
Critical problems arise in this context in the course of proceedings
involving undercover agents, informers etc. where the government may
refuse to allow them to testify and block their evidence under § 96 for
reasons of national security or a danger to their life, limb or liberty, and
only permits their "handlers" to testify as hearsay evidence. 106
102 The rule has been relaxed under § 420 for the expedited procedure under §§ 417 ff
and is also applicable to the Strafbefehl procedure via § 411(2) 2nd sentence.
103 A panel sitting with professional and lay judges may commission all the professional
judges on the panel; BGH NStZ 1983, 182 and 421. .
104 The BGH has held that the commissioned judge does not actually have to Slt on the
triallater on if she was commissioned before (see § 63) the trial began; BGHSt 2, 1. This
can happen, for example, if the judge is assigned to another docket after th~ trial C?urt
admitted the indictment and she took the evidence, but before the actual tnal hearmgs
begin.
105 BGHSt 15, 253. See on the (critical) reception ofthe old common law "best evidence
rule" in the modem day practice ofEngland and Wales Adrian Keane et al., The Modern
Law ofEvidence, 8th ed., 2010, 27 - 29.
106 KK-PfeifferlHannich Einleitung Mn. 9.
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Concentration and speedy trial principles (Konzentrationsprinzip and
Beschleunigungsgrundsatz)
These two principles are closely interrelated and aim at a fast and
efficient disposal of a case, in the case of the speedy trial mle most
obviously in the interest of the defendant who will want to know as soon
as possible his future fate. The concentration principle in particular means
that a trial should be managed with as few hearing dates as possible. The
law distinguishes in this respect between the Aussetzung (decision leading
to a full retrial ab initio) and the Unterbrechung (adjournment). An
adjournment may be ordered for aperiod of up to three weeks, but for not
more than a month107 between hearings (§ 229(1) and (2)); anything that
happened in the trial previously retains is validity. 1fthat period cannot be
kept, all previous procedural acts are extinguished and the trial must start
again from scratch (§ 229(4) 1st sentence). The temptation to set hearing
dates at three-week intervals is countered by the speedy trial mle. lOS The
latter has not been specifically codified in the StPO but conceptually
supplants several of its provisions and flows from Arts. 5(3) 2nd sentence
and 6(1) 1st sentence ECHR as weIl as the Rechtsstaat principle. 109 A
speedy trial, apart from serving the interest of the defendant, is also a
guarantee for preserving the evidence in its best possible state: The longer
a case lasts, the greater the danger of loss of memory by or illness or
death of (old) witnesses, or of destruction or deterioration of real evidence
such as documents, specimens etc. The determination of an appropriate
timeframe can be difficult in the individual case and the mere lapse of
time, especially if no blame can be apportioned to the justice system, may
be a sentencing factor under § 46 StGB but will not normally give rise to
a violation of the speedy trial principle under Convention standards or
German law. 110 After the decision of the Great Senate of the BGH of 17
January 2008 111, violations of the speedy trial mle are now sanctioned
through the so-called Vollstreckungsläsung (enforcement solution): The
court first determines, in the case of a conviction112, the appropriate
sentence taking into account the length of the proceedings, but without
regard to the legal aspect of the violation of the Convention (as had been
the case previously), and then declares on the basis of the severity of the
107 If the trial has already lasted for ten days, and then for each new block of ten days;
KK-PfeifferlHannich Einleitung Mn. 10.
108 BGR NJW 2006, 3077.
109 BVerfGE 63, 45; NStZ 2006,680.
110 See the references in KK-PfeifferlHannich Einleitung Mn. 11.
111 NJW 2008, 860.
112 The BGR has held that in cases of an acquittal the provisions of the Gesetz über die
Entschädigung für Strafverfolgungsmaßnahmen (StrEG), Le. the Criminal Proceedings
(Compensation) Act, do not apply mutatis mutandis; there is thus a tension with the view
of the ECtRR who requires some form of compensation for material damage and pain
and suffering if a mere statement that the actions of the state violated the Convention is
not enough; see MG Art. 6 MRK Mn. 9d with further references, and at 9g for the cases
ofviolations of other conventions or procedural principles.
violation which part of that sentence shall be considered to have been
servedY3 This approach avoids the problems caused by the old system
with statutory minimum sentences and thus allows for a credit to be given
even in cases of a mandatory life sentence.114
Free evaluation 0/evidence (Freie Beweiswürdigung)
Free evaluation of evidence (§ 261) does not mean a judicial free-for-all
with respect to what the court makes of the evidence presented before it,
but it means freedom from strict mIes of evidence. For example, in
previous times before the 19th century, the German law operated
evidential mIes that remind one of those in Islamic Shari'ah: A
confession by the defendant provided full proof of the charges against
him, as did two witnesses of unimpeachable character. If there was only
one witness, the charge was proven only half and the judge was then
permitted to proceed to the peinliche Befragung (painful interrogation) or
in other words, to torture. In the first half of the 19th century these mIes
were abolished and a system introduced that followed the French
principle of the intime conviction, as set out, for example, in Art. 342 of
the Code d'instruction criminelle of 1808.05 § 261 requires the judge to
be convinced of the facts before he proceeds to conviction and sentence.
In effect, this is much the same as the judicial instruction in England and
Wales to the members of the jury that they "must be sure" that the
defendant committed the acts he is charged with before they can fmd him
guilty. The law acknowledges that no human being can have absolute
certainty of any fact, not even those she may have witnessed herself.
Therefore no merely theoretically possible alternative will prevent a
conviction, but only one that is reasonably possible. The German law
consequently does not ask the judge for absolute certainty, but for his
own conviction based on the laws of logic and the absence of vernünftige
116 d d d·· f hiZweifel, that is, reasonable doubt - an an a equate escnptlon 0 s
argument in the Urteil, something not required of English juries, for
example.
In dubio pro reD
As we saw above when we looked at the presumption of innocence, the
application of this principle requires the existence of a fmite amount of
113 Rowever, the courts advise caution with regard to a too generous application of this
role and require a serious violation in addition to the length ofthe proceedings; see BGR
StV 2008,633; 2010,228.
114 BGR NJW 2006, 1529. - For further explanation see KK.-PfeifferlHannich Einleitung
Mn. 12 - 13b and MG Art. 6 MRK Mn. 9.
115 KK.-PfeifferlHannich Einleitung Mn. 14.
116 BGRSt 10,208; StV 1999,5; NJW 1999, 1562; NStZ-RR 1999, 332.
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evidence: Only when the judge has seen and heard all the evidence in a
case will she be able to decide what and whom she can believe. The in
dubio rule is about the factual basis for the guilt of the defendant, it does
therefore not apply to each and every piece of evidence, but only to the
totality of the evidencel17: A judge may be unsure whether to believe
witnesses A, Band C because their memory may have been hazy, their
testimony hearsay or an outright lie; yet, if he is sure that he can believe
the incriminating testimony of witnesses D - Hand maybe the expert X
in a case, then he has no reasonable doubt about the guilt of the
defendant. Because it is a principle that attaches to the evaluation of
evidence, the in dubio rule has no application for questions of law: If a
certain provision can be given a strict and a lenient interpretation and
clear guidance from the legislator is missing, the court is not obliged to
choose the more lenient one if there are good reasons for choosing the
strict one.118 The question as to whether the rule applies to factual
uncertainty in procedural matters as weIl, for example,
117 Consistentjurisprudence ofthe courts: BGH NStZ 1999,205; 2002, 656; NStZ-RR
2005,209.
118 BGHSt 14,68.
119 Yes: BGHSt 18, 274.
120 Yes: BGHSt 22, 90.
121 Yes: BayObLG NJW 1968,2118.
122 Yes: BGHSt 12, 116.
123 No: OLG Karlsruhe NJW 1974, 806. - A certain amount ofuncertainty is immanent
in that stage of the proceedings; it will, however, playapart in the overall reflections of
the prosecution about the likelihood of a conviction; OLG Kar1sruhe Justiz 2003, 272;
OLG BambergNStZ 1991,252.
124 No: BGH NStZ 1984, 181. - This must be distinguished from the scenario of whether
a trial may take place if the trial judge has doubts about whether the defendant is fit to
plead and none ofthe criteria in §§ 231(2) (voluntary unlawful absence ofthe defendant
from the hearing) or § 231a (intentionally putting oneselfin astate ofunfitness to plead)
are fulfilled: In that case the rule applies; BGH NStZ 1984,520; BVerfGE 51, 324.
125 No: BGHSt 10,245.
126 No: BGHSt 16, 164. - Procedural errors must be fully demonstrated by the appellant
on appeal; as far as § 136a on forbidden means of interrogation is concemed, the
appellate court must ascertain these for itself through the Freibeweisverfahren
•
•
•
•
•
•
whether the prosecution of an offence is barred by the statute of
limitations119
whether a re~uest to prosecute was filed in time120,
whether double jeopardy is triggered121,
whether a young adult was still of the same developmental stage
as a juvenile122,
whether the prosecution has to apply it when deciding whether to
indict the suspect123,
whether on appeal a procedural bar is raised based on whether the
defendant is unfit to stand tria1124,
whether the withdrawal of an appeal was valid125,
whether a procedural error has occurred126,
has been answered on a case-by-case basis so far. 127
Open justice (Öjfentlichkeitsgrundsatz)
§ 169 GVG has already been mentioned above under the heading of the
Mündlichkeitsprinzip. It refers only to the trial proceedings, not to a duty
of the courts to publicise their decisions adequately.128 German law does,
however, not subscribe to the understanding of open justice as practised
in England and Wales, where it includes the right of the media to report
about suspects from the earliest stages of the proceedings with inclusion
of their full name, address and picture.129 The open justice principle exists
in a natural tension with the protection of the interests of victims, and the
rules about the latter have been significantly strengthened in recent
years. 130 The public may be excluded from the hearing for reasons of
victim protection, for example in sexual offence cases, or if there is a
concem based on public morality etc. The reasons are set out in §§ 170-
175:
• Hearings in the family court and the cautelary jurisdiction
(Freiwillige Gerichtsbarkeit) are in principle always in camera;
the public may exceptionally be admitted, although not normally
over the objection of one of the parties (§ 170 GVG);
• the public may be excluded in cases of a Sicherungsverfahren (§§
413 - 415) with the aim of sequestering the offender in amental
health hospital or in custodial addiction treatment (§ 171a GVG);
• the court may exclude the public if in the course of a hearing the
intimate sphere of any of the parties, victims or witnesses etc. is
being discussed; this may include the defendant131; the exclusion
must not be ordered if the protected person objects to it132 (§ 171b
GVG);
(discretionary evidence), Le. the court is not bound to use the means of evidence
provided for in the StPO for the purpose of establishing the guilt of the defendant
(Strengbeweis - strict evidence): It may, for example, make a simple phone call to
establish whether a violation has occurred, something it could not base a conviction on.
127 KK-PfeifferlHannich Einleitung Mn. 19 - 20.
128 See KK-PfeifferlHannich Einleitung Mn. 21.
129 See the critical paper by Michael Bohlander, Open Justice or Open Season? (2010)
Journal ofCriminal Law 321.
130 KK-PfeifferlHannich Einleitung Mn. 21.
131 MG § 171b GVG Mn. 3.
132 This would appear to be unusual, but from my own experience as a judge in a slightly
different scenario I remember the case of a young woman who had been raped and
seriously sexually abused in various ways by the defendant, whilst being trapped in an
elevator with him, for over half an hour, all the time being threatened by him with a
weapon. When I asked her whether she wished to have the defendant excluded for the
duration of her testimony about the intimate facts of the abuse, she answered: ''No, he
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• an exclusion may be ordered for reasons of national security,
public order and morality; to protect life, limb or freedom of a
witness; to protect an important business or trade secret or tax
confidentiality, if the interets of the protected person outweigh
that of an open court discussion; if a private secret is going to be
discussed the divulging of which by an expert or witness might be
an offence under § 203 StGB; if a person under the age of 18 is
being heard (§ 172 GVG).
The verdict, i.e. the operating part or Tenor of the Urteil must always be
pronounced in public, although the public may again be excluded for the
reasons set out in §§ 171b, 172 GVG when the court gives its reasons for
the decision (§ 173 GVG).
Conclusion
This paper is hoped to have served as a useful introduction to some of the
fundamental parameters of German criminal procedure. Too many people
outside the German system, even within the German-speaking world,
have only nebulous ideas about the basic principles that guide its
procedures. Labels such as "inquisitorial", "professional judiciary" and
"bureaucratic procedures" that are bandied about, not infrequently in a
derogatory manner, in the legal discussion between systems mislead its
participants about the deeper meaning and history of such concepts and
shroud the view at their actual shape in the modem world. German
criminal procedure is certainly very different from, for example, English
and Welsh law but, as can be seen from what was explained above, there
is no longer any place for criticism based on badly and superficially
informed statements such as those mentioned in the beginning of the
paper about the burden of proof, the right to silence etc. German
procedure is a sophisticated and sometimes admittedly overly regulated
system that aims at finely balancing the competing interests of the public,
the victims and the defence. As with any issue of public policy, there are
often multiple and equally valid ways of reaching a solution to resolve
that tension that is acceptable in a society. What some ofthe parties to the
comparative discussion, it would appear, still must leam to understand,
even after many years of comparative research on all sides, is that the fact
that another system has made a choice one's own system has not made or
maybe even frowns upon, is as such not a sufficient reason to denigrate
shall hear what he did to me!" She was, if it may be said to her credit, the deadliest of
witnesses imaginable: calm, detached and precise in her memory despite the ordeal she
had been subjected to. - Equally memorable, albeit for different reasons, was the
defendant's counsel, also a woman, who started her closing speech with the words: "Life
has many faces ..." (Das Leben ist vielfältig...), insinuating that the victim may have
enjoyed the events as "rough sex".
the other system as unjust. Comparative research is a fascinating
endeavour and indispensable in modem law-making, not only because of
the effects of European legal convergence and harmonisation, but also
because of its importance for the creation of principles and mIes of
intemationallaw under Art. 38 ofthe Statute ofthe lCI. Nothing could be
worse in that context than making badly informed assumptions the basis
for the creation of law at the European and international level.
